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337 
REFORMING MICROFINANCE TO SUIT DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES: THE RIGHT WAY AND THE ZIMBABWE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are few countries in Africa that possess as much economic 
potential as Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has an impressive trade portfolio 
including exports of nickel, diamonds, tobacco, and gold; annually, each 
of these commodities brings hundreds of millions of dollars into the 
Zimbabwe economy.
1
 In 2001, Zimbabwe had a trade surplus of 
approximately 323 million U.S. dollars.
2
 Because of its abundant natural 
resources, Zimbabwe has been dubbed “Africa’s Breadbasket.”
3
 
In the early 2000’s, Zimbabwe’s economy took a sharp downward turn. 
By 2003, Zimbabwe had Africa’s fastest shrinking economy and there 
were several contributing factors.
4
 The first was Zimbabwe’s involvement 
in the Second Congo War, which was prohibitively expensive for a 
country of its size.
5
 Zimbabwe President Mugabe, who still holds office, 
led a controversial land reform program that took farmland owned by 
white Zimbabweans and placed it in the hands of the Zimbabwean 
government.
6
 The program devastated Zimbabwe’s agricultural industry.
7
 
 
 
 1. Zimbabwe, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/ 
country/zwe/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/K6NX-X94F. 
 2. Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations & World Food Programme, FAO/WFP Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, Table 1 (June 18, 2008), available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai469e/ai469e00.pdf. Reports estimate Zimbabwe now had a 3.6 
billion U.S. dollar trade deficit in 2012. See Zimbabwe’s trade deficit stands at US$3,6bn, ZIMBABWE 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/01/25/zimbabwes-trade-deficit-
stands-at-us36bn/. 
 3. Zimbabwe: From Breadbasket to Basket Case, THE ECONOMIST, June 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/1201137.  
 4. Samantha Power, How to Kill a Country, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-country/302845/. See also Christopher Orlet, 
From Breadbasket to Dustbowl, THE SPECTATOR (Apr. 13, 2005), http://spectator.org/archives/ 
2005/04/13/from-breadbasket-to-dustbowl. 
 5. THE WORLD FACT BOOK: ZIMBABWE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). See also Justin 
Pearce, Mugabe’s Costly Congo Venture, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/ 611898.stm (discussing the various costs of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo 
War). 
 6. The Zimbabwe land reform was a response to colonialism and was seen as the indigenous 
Zimbabweans taking back their land. See generally Nick Dancaescu, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 615 (2003). See also John McClung Nading, Comment, Property Under Siege: The 
Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 737 (2002) (discussing the legality of 
the land reform program from the perspective of several theories of property). See also Caitlin Shay, 
Comment, Fast Track to Collapse: How Zimbabwe’s Fast-Track Land Reform Program Violates 
International Human Rights Protections to Property, Due Process, and Compensation, 27 AM. U. 
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It has also damaged Zimbabwe’s reputation in the international 
community, resulting in economic sanctions and the loss of major trade 
partners.
8
  
When tax revenues on export income started to freefall, the 
Zimbabwean government began printing money in order to service its 
debt, causing one of the most extraordinary cases of hyperinflation ever 
seen.
9
 In July of 2008, inflation in Zimbabwe hit 231,150,888%.
10
 By 
 
 
INT’L L. REV. 133 (2012) (providing specific policy recommendations so that Zimbabwe’s legal 
system will no longer permit land reform). Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court ruled that these land reforms 
were illegal. [Citation] The Mugabe administration publicly chastised the Supreme Court. [Citation] 
Intimidation towards the white judges sitting on the court followed and all white judges resigned from 
the court shortly after. Fast-track land reforms continued shortly afterwards. Ben Freeth, Racial 
Discrimination in Zimbabwe: A Systematic Program of Abuse, SADC TRIBUNAL RIGHTS WATCH 
(Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/Racial%20Discrimination%20in%20Zim. 
pdf. [No reference to white judges in this source] The constitution has since been amended to forbid 
legal challenges to fast-track land reform programs as well as any suits by white farmers seeking 
damages as a result of the programs. Id. There has been little recourse for the violent program, which 
resulted in the death of twenty six farm workers. Over a thousand workers were assaulted and eleven 
were raped as a result of fast-track land reform. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAST TRACK LAND REFORM 
IN ZIMBABWE (Mar. 2002) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand 
0302.pdf. Not surprisingly, this program halted most agricultural production and the industry has yet to 
recover. 
 7. Jack Lewis, South Africa: Don’t be Fooled—Zimbabwe’s Land Reform is No Success, 
ALLAFRICA (July 13, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201307311138.html.  
 8. The United States responded with several sanctions that made it illegal to provide financial 
assistance to the Zimbabwean government. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT YOU NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ 
zimb.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). The Obama Administration, demonstrating little faith in the 
Zimbabwe government, has also recently decided to extend the sanctions. U.S. Says Zimbabwe Vote 
Flawed, Won’t Lift Sanctions, REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/ 
us-zimbabwe-election-usa-idUSBRE97I0U820130819. The European Union has recently decided to 
lift all sanctions against Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Diamond Sanction Lifted, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/zimbabwe-diamond-sanction-lifted-eu-rewarding-mugabe-rigged-election 
-1408862 (stating that the EU has been widely criticized for doing so). China has maintained strong 
economic ties to Zimbabwe. The post-sanction trade policy of Zimbabwe has been to look to trading 
partners in the Eastern hemisphere. Joshua Eisenman, Zimbabwe: China’s African Ally, THE 
JAMESTOWN FOUND. (July 5, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20070805023113/http://www. 
jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3390&article_id=2369974. 
 9. Matthew Boesler, How 9 Countries Saw Inflation Evolve into Hyperinflation, Business 
Insider (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/worst-hyperinflation-episodes-in-history-2013-
9?op=1. Prices on goods in Zimbabwe doubled every 25 hours. Id. 
 10. A History of Zimbabwe Hyperinflation, ZIMBABWEDOLLARS.NET, http://zimbabwe dollars. 
net/blogs/zimbabwe-news/8979795-a-history-of-zimbabwe-hyperinflation (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). 
Inflation had gotten so bad that as Zimbabwe began to issue notes of higher value, they began to have 
difficulty fitting all the zeros on each note. Id. The government attempted to control this inflation by 
instituting harsh price controls on basic goods. These price controls resulted in widespread shortages 
of basic goods. Michael Wines, Zimbabwe Price Controls Cause Chaos, NY TIMES (July 3, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/world/africa/03cnd-wzimbabwe.html. At one point, the 
government was printing a note at the value of one hundred trillion dollars, the highest denomination 
ever used as currency. Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS (2011), 
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/annual/2011/annual11b.pdf. Presently, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss2/8
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January 2009, most Zimbabweans had abandoned their country’s 
currency.
11
 The Zimbabwean government has now suspended use of the 
Zimbabwean dollar and uses the U.S. dollar and South African rand as the 
predominant currencies.
12
 As a result of these shocks to the economy, 
poverty has become rampant in Zimbabwe.
13
 The World Bank estimates 
that 72% of Zimbabweans live in poverty.
14
  
In addition to high rates of poverty, several social issues plague 
Zimbabwe. Racial discrimination and gender inequality are prevalent in 
nearly every aspect of Zimbabwean life.
15
 Zimbabwean women face 
 
 
these bills have no value as currency, but are worth approximately five dollars as a collectible. This 
amount is still approximately fifteen times more than what they were worth when the bills were still in 
circulation. Patrick McGroarty & Farai Mutsaka, How to Turn 100 Trillion Dollars Into Five and Feel 
Good About It, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274 
8703730804576314953091790360. 
 11. In Dollars They Trust, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
finance-and-economics/21576665-grubby-greenbacks-dear-credit-full-shops-and-empty-factories-dollars-
they. 
 12. Id. Zimbabwe’s finance minister has stated that the Zimbabwean dollar is unlikely to return 
in the near future. Colls Ndlovu, Zimdollar Versus the Multicurrency System, BULAWAYO24 (Oct. 18 
2013), available at http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-38030.html (arguing 
that Zimbabwe’s lack of national currency has helped keep inflation in check and suggesting that the 
current multicurrency system should be kept in place permanently).  
 13. It’s worth noting that the ‘shocks’ all took place under the leadership of President Robert 
Mugabe. His political career has been marred by accusations of racism, violence, and inept leadership. 
There are also pleas to have Mr. Mugabe arrested and tried before the International Criminal Court to 
answer for the actions of his violent regime. Alex Bell, UN Urged to Refer Mugabe to International 
Criminal Court, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 13, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201308140230.html. Most 
international organizations have suspected Mugabe’s regime of rigging elections in order to keep 
perpetuate his term in office. Robert I. Rotberg, Starving the Voters is How Mugabe has Rigged the 
Election, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL NEWS ARCHIVE, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/ 
news/news-archive/starving-the-voters-is-how-mugabe-has-rigged-the-election (last accessed Jan. 17, 
2014).  
 14. THE WORLD BANK, ZIMBABWE DATA, available at http://data.worldbank. org/country/ 
zimbabwe (last accessed Oct. 27, 2013). Additionally, some economists have estimated that the 
unemployment level is around 70%, but this figure reflects formal employment and does not account 
for the informal sector. Zimbabwe’s Unemployment Rate Tops 70%, BULAWAYO24 (Apr. 22, 2013), 
available at http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-business-sc-economy-byo-29277.html. Zimbabwe’s 
finance minister has denied the accuracy of these reports and claims that unemployment is actually 
9%. Zimbabwe’s Unemployment is 9%, Says Biti, BULAWAYO24 (June 7, 2013), available at 
http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-business-sc-economy-byo-31337.html.  
 15. Zimbabwe was ranked 116 out of 148 countries in gender equality in the most recent United 
Nations Development Report. The quality of medical care for women is horrendous; for every 100,000 
live births, 570 Zimbabwean women will die from pregnancy complications. This average for Sub-
Saharan Africa is only 47 deaths for every 100,000 births. Additionally, women only occupy 17.9% of 
the seats in Zimbabwe’s parliament. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, UNITED NATIONS 
DEV.ELOPMENT REPORT 2013, 158, available at http://www.zw.one.un.org/sites/default/files/ 
HDR2013%20Report%20English.pdf. Zimbabwe has strived to improve in this area. The government 
recently adopted an amendment to their constitution which would mandate gender equality and forbid 
discrimination on the basis of gender. Zimbabweans Say Yes to New Constitution Strong on Gender 
Equality and Women’s Rights, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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limited access to employment and are less likely to escape poverty than 
Zimbabwean men.
16
 Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and 
Community Development stated that their goal is to “eradicate gender 
discrimination and inequalities in all spheres of life and development.
17
 
This is important not only to help improve the quality of life for women, 
but also to help advance the Zimbabwean economy. Gender equality and 
economic development are inextricably linked and efforts to further 
gender equality will significantly benefit Zimbabwe’s economy.
18
  
Similarly, Zimbabwe could also benefit economically from promoting 
racial equality.
19
 Unlike gender inequality, the current political 
administration has expressed no desire to remedy the widespread racial 
discrimination affecting its white citizens.
20
 In fact the Mugabe 
administration has exacerbated discrimination in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s 
Indigenization and Empowerment Act (“Empowerment Act”) was passed 
to help native Zimbabweans reclaim their economic sector from foreign 
interference. The bill requires white and foreign-owned businesses to have 
 
 
Women (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.unwomen.org/lo/news/stories/2013/4/zimbabweans-say-yes-to-
new-constitution-strong-on-gender-equality-and-womens-rights (last accessed Jan. 17, 2014). 
 16. The National Gender Policy, Republic of Zimbabwe—Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender 
and Community Development at 5 (2013), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/zimbabwe/docs/ 
Governance/National%20Gender%20Policy%202013.pdf (last accessed Jan. 17, 2014).  
 17. The policy does state that “Zimbabwe recognises that economic growth programmes that 
target women (Womenomics) make good economics. As such, the economic empowerment of women 
has become a key priority for the Government of Zimbabwe to achieve sustainable economic growth.” 
Id. at 11.  
 18. See generally Derek H.C. Chen, Gender Equality and Economic Development—The Role for 
Information and Communication Technologies, THE WORLD BANK, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/ 
pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3285 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (stating that statistics show developing 
countries have achieved more significant economic development once they are able to lower education 
and workforce gaps between men and women). Zimbabwe has also taken the position that advancing 
gender equality will help provide a boost to its economy. See supra note 16. 
 19. John Aziz, Less Racism and Sexism Means More Economic Growth, THE WEEK (Dec. 16, 
2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/254170/less-racism-and-sexism-means-more-economic-growth. 
Contra Lucy Mazingi & Richard Kamidza, Inequality in Zimbabwe, OPEN SOC’Y INITIATIVE FOR S. 
AFR., available at http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/chapter_5_-_zimbabwe.pdf (arguing 
that the discriminatory treatment towards white farmers as part of the fast-track land reforms was 
economically necessary in order to narrow the white-black income gap). 
 20. In fact, President Mugabe infamously said that “[w]e must continue to strike fear into the 
heart of the white man, our real enemy” in a speech before Zimbabwe’s parliament. Brian Kagoro, A 
Case Analysis of the Zimbabwean Crisis and NEPAD’s Peer Review Mechanism, SOUTH AFRICAN 
REGIONAL POVERTY NETWORK (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/ 
d0000068/page3.php. Mugabe is also quoted as saying “the only language that the mabhunu (‘white 
man’) will understand is the language of the gun. The more you kill, the nearer you get to your 
objective.” Ben Freeth, Mugabe and the White African, at 56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss2/8
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51% ownership held by indigenous Zimbabweans.
21
 Because of these 
strict requirements, the Empowerment Act has chased foreign business 
from Zimbabwe.
22
 The bill has a troubling resemblance to the fast-track 
land reform programs of the early 2000s.
23
 Because of the current 
administration’s attitude toward racial discrimination, it is unlikely any 
meaningful progress could be made in this area; however, any reform 
hoping to achieve economic growth must work towards ending racial 
discrimination.  
One solution for alleviating poverty and promoting social equality is 
the use of microfinance. Microfinance has been successful in reducing 
poverty in many developing countries.
24
 Zimbabwe currently has 
microfinance institutions which serve the poor, but they are 
undercapitalized, unregulated, and are more interested in generating profit 
than creating meaningful economic growth for Zimbabwe.
25
 The 
Zimbabwean government has stated its commitment to improving the 
microfinance sector in order to help alleviate poverty.
26
 The Zimbabwean 
 
 
 21. Blackening the Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 13 2007), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/9804332. The Empowerment Act defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as “any person who, before 
the 18th April 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and 
any descendant of such person, and includes any company, association, syndicate or partnership of 
which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or hold the controlling interest”. 
Safiyya Patel, Indigenisation Laws to Affect More Sectors in Zimbabwe, HOW WE MADE IT IN AFR. 
(Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/indigenisation-law-to-affect-
more-sectors-in-zimbabwe/19150/. 
 22. Gibbs Dube, Economists Clash Over Inidigenization of Zimbabwe Economy, VOICE OF 
AMERICA (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.voazimbabwe.com/content/zimbabwe-indigenization-and-
economic-empowerment-series-part-two/1612941.html 
 23. See supra Part I. 
 24. BancoSol in Bolivia is a microfinance institution that has achieved remarkable success. 
BancoSol was founded in 1986 and has now loaned over $344 million dollars and operates as a for-
profit entity. See Accion | BancoSol, http://www.accion.org/our-impact/bancosol? (last visited Oct. 27, 
2013). Capitec Bank in South Africa has achieved similar success in providing banking services to the 
lower income sector. See Gerhard Coetzee, Innovative Approaches to Delivering Microfinance 
Services: The Case of Capitec Bank, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.28168/ 
26197_file_Innovations_in_Micr.pdf (last accessed Oct. 28, 2013). 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. Microfinance has several definitions, but its purpose and functions can be best summarized 
as a “type of banking service that is provided to unemployed or low-income individuals or groups who 
would otherwise have no other means of gaining financial services. Ultimately, the goal of 
microfinance is to give low income people an opportunity to become self-sufficient by providing a 
means of saving money, borrowing money and insurance.” Microfinance Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microfinance.asp. Some scholars view the term more broadly 
and use microfinance to describe the allocation of financial services to the poor, including the basic 
banking services such as savings, credit, checking, as well as other financial services such as 
insurance. David Roodman & Uzma Qureshi, Microfinance as a Business, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., at 
2, Nov. 2006 available at http://www.cgdev.org/files/10742_file_Microfinance_as_Business.pdf.  
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House of Assembly is currently reviewing a bill, the Microfinance Act, 
which will bring much-needed reform to Zimbabwe’s microfinance 
industry.
27
 Although a well-run microfinance industry will not solve all of 
Zimbabwe’s economic problems, it could be the key to helping 
Zimbabweans escape poverty. 
In order to fully understand the potential impact of microfinance 
reform in Zimbabwe, it is important to understand Zimbabwe’s informal 
sector. The informal sector is a large component of Zimbabwe’s economy, 
and it could benefit tremendously from sound microfinance reform. 
II. ZIMBABWE’S INFORMAL SECTOR 
Like many developing countries, Zimbabwe’s economy is divided into 
two sectors—the informal and formal sectors.
28
 Zimbabwe’s informal 
sector is unique in that it is exceptionally large.
29
 Opinions are divided on 
whether or not the continued existence of the informal sector is good for 
the overall economy.
30
 The informal sector of Zimbabwe’s economy 
 
 
 27. Parliament of Zimbabwe—Votes and Proceedings of the Senate, 4–5 (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/attachments/article/77/5_June_2013_21.pdf (last accessed Feb. 2 2014).  
 28. INT’L LABOUR ORG., INFORMAL ECONOMY, http://www.ilo.int/global/topics/employment-
promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). The formal sector of an 
economy consists of businesses operating within the law, whereas the informal sector consists of 
businesses operating either on the fringe or outside of the law. There are five general characteristics of 
an informal sector: ease of access and entry; small scale; labor-intensive undertakings; usually family-
owned enterprises; and operating in unregulated, competitive markets. A few examples of informal 
sector businesses include street vendors, gypsy taxis, and some small-scale production shops (such as 
sandal makers). Veronica Brand, One Dollar Workplaces: A Study of Informal Sector Activities in 
Magaba, Harare, 1 J. SOC. DEV. IN AFRICA 53, 53 (1986), available at http://archive.lib.msu.edu/ 
DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/social%20development/vol1no2/jsda001002007.pdf. Most African 
countries have large informal sectors. Approximately 55% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and 80% of 
its labor force can be attributed to the economic activity of its informal sector. Mthuli Ncube, 
Recognizing Africa’s Informal Sector, AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www. 
afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/recognizing-africas-informal-
sector-11645/. One difficulty with informal sectors is that they do not pay taxes. Id.  
 29. As of 2012, it is estimated that 84% of Zimbabweans are employed in the informal sector 
while only 11% have found employment in the formal sector. The proliferation of this sector is largely 
due to unemployment caused by the economic downturns mentioned in Part I. Majority Employed in 
Informal Sector—Zimstat Survey, THE STANDARD (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.thestandard.co. 
zw/2012/11/04/majority-employed-in-informal-sector-zimstat-survey/. See also Latham Shinder, 
Zimbabwe’s Informal Sector, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 72 (1998), available at http://heinonline.org/ 
HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/month121&div=30&id=&page= (arguing that the struggles 
of the agricultural industry, once Zimbabwe’s largest employer, have significantly contributed to the 
growth of employment in the informal sector). 
 30. Businesses in the informal sector operate without licensing and typically do not pay taxes. 
This is especially troublesome for Zimbabwe’s revenue-starved government. The government has 
strict licensing requirements for all street vendors. This requirement is seldom followed. See Latham 
Shinder, Zimbabwe’s Informal Sector, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 72 (1998), available at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss2/8
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represents the bulk of its small-to-medium-sized enterprises
31
 and has 
helped Zimbabweans find employment as the economy has collapsed.
32
 
Zimbabwe’s informal sector is vital to the country’s economic growth 
and could play a large role in poverty alleviation. The Minister of Finance 
and Economic Development, Patrick Chinamasa, recently stated that 
stimulating economic growth would require Zimbabwe to tap into the 
value of the informal sector.
33
 Microfinance is one method by which 
businesses in the informal sector could become scalable
34
 and eventually 
integrated into the formal sector.
35
 Zimbabwe’s economy is lopsided in 
 
 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/month121&div=30&id=&page=. See also 
Informal Sector to Pay Tax, THE ZIMBABWEAN, Nov. 12, 2013, available at http://www.the 
zimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/69737/informal-sector-to-pay-tax.html (detailing the Zimbabwean 
government’s new plan to enforce payment of taxes in the informal sector). See also Call to Allow 
Zimra to Tax Informal Sector, THE CHRONICLE (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.chronicle.co.zw/call-to-
allow-zimra-to-tax-informal-sector/ (demonstrating that there is public support for taxing the informal 
sector; however, this support seems to come from the formal sector). However, many consider the 
informal sector’s boost to the overall economy and its ability to keep a large labor force employed to 
outweigh the downside of diminished tax revenues. Informal Employment Sustains Zimbabweans, IRIN 
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.irinnews.org/report/97825/informal-employment-sustains-
zimbabweans. See also Martin Stobart, Informal Sector Drives Zimbabwe’s Economy, THE CHRONICLE 
(Oct. 5, 2013),http://www.chronicle.co.zw/informal-sector-drives-zimbabwes-economy/ (claiming that 
the informal sector is now the true “breadwinner of the economy”). Additionally, there are some points 
where it is clear that the strength of the informal sector has benefits for the whole Zimbabwean 
economy. For instance, many raw materials are purchased for small-scale production and those who 
make their living in the informal sector often make some part of their earnings in the formal sector. 
Informal Sector: The Major Challenge, ZIMBABWE SITUATION (Sept. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit_informal-sector-the-major-challenge/. 
 31. Arison Tamfu, Zimbabwe’s Troubled Informal Sector, MSME NEWS NETWORK (May 2014) 
available at http://www.msmenewsnetwork.com/index.php/homepage/sme-features/sme-news/item/ 
2555-zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-troubled-informal-sector. 
 32. See Shinder, supra note 29. 
 33. Informal Sector Key to Growth, THE HERALD (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.herald.co.zw/ 
informal-sector-key-to-growth/. 
 34. Scalability is described as “[a] characteristic of a system, model or function that describes its 
capability to cope and perform under an increased or expanding workload. A system that scales well 
will be able to maintain or even increase its level of performance or efficiency when tested by larger 
operational demands.” Scalability Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
s/scalability.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).  
 35. Microfinance has played a vital role in helping informal sector businesses. See Flore Gubert 
& François Roubaud, The Impact of Microfinance Loans on Small Informal Enterprises in 
Madagascar, INT’L INST. OF SOC. STUDIES (May 2011), available at http://www.iss.nl/ fileadmin/ 
ASSETS/iss/Documents/Research_and_projects/Unlocking_potential_Microfinance.pdf (showing that 
MFIs in Madagascar have played a crucial role in allowing informal enterprises to accumulate assets); 
Jean-Pierre Muimana Kalala & Alpha Ouedraogo, Savings Products and Services in the Informal 
Sector and Microfinance Institutions in West Africa: The Case of Mali and Benin, MICROSAVE (Sept. 
2001), available at http://zunia.org/sites/default/files/media/node-files/36/148639_3662_03662.pdf 
(suggesting that Mali and Benin both have robust informal sectors and would likely benefit 
tremendously from a microfinance industry capable of servicing the informal sector).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
344 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:337 
 
 
 
 
that the majority of the country’s economy is in the informal sector. This 
means that, unlike other developing countries, microfinance has the 
potential to provide capital to most of the businesses in Zimbabwe. 
While microfinance institutions are prevalent in Zimbabwe,
36
 other 
developing countries,
37
 and even some industrialized countries,
38
 they 
have not all enjoyed the same level of success. For the purposes of 
evaluating Zimbabwe’s attempts at reforming its microfinance industry, it 
is important to first examine the model of a successful microfinance 
sector. 
III. MICROFINANCE 
A microfinance institution (“MFI”) provides financial and banking 
services to the poor.
39
 In regards to lending, MFIs are very different from 
banks. Because their customers are poor, MFIs typically do not require 
 
 
 36. See infra Part IV.  
 37. For an overview of microfinance’s role in developing economies worldwide, see Roberto 
Moro Visconti, A Survey on Microfinance for Developing Countries: A Social Responsible Investment 
Opportunity, UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE DEP’T OF BUS.ADMIN. (Apr. 10, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1284472. 
 38. MFIs do exist in the United States, the most prominent MFI would be Grameen America. 
Grameen America was created by Muhammud Yunus and despite being operated in a country with a 
very sophisticated and complex economy, it retains many aspects of the original Grameen Bank in 
Bangalore. About Us, GRAMEEN AMERICA, http://grameenamerica.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 17, 
2014). The issue of access to banking has been raised after the United States Post Office inspector 
general released a report on poor populations which are underserved by banks. The report also 
suggested that Postal Offices begin offering basic banking services, including loans, to poor 
communities. Mersha Baradaran, The Post Office Banks on the Poor, NY TIMES (Feb. 7 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/opinion/the-post-office-banks-on-the-poor.html?_r=0.  
 39. Despite having a philanthropic purpose, some MFIs have achieved remarkable financial 
success. Robert Annibale, Microfinance: Building Domestic Markets in Developing Countries, 
http://www.thegiin.org/binary-data/RESOURCE/download_file/000/000/51-1.pdf (last accessed Oct. 
27, 2013) (discussing the potential revenue MFIs can generate while making contributions to poverty 
alleviation). Bolivia’s BancoSol is another remarkable example of the potential profit a MFI can 
generate. See Pamela Das, Avoiding A Subprime-Like Crises in Microfinance: Lessons from the 
Mexican and Bolivian Experience, 15 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 819, 836 (2009) (detailing BancoSol’s 
success; BancoSol has surpassed the profitability of traditional banks in Bolivia). 
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collateral
40
 and typically issue loans for entrepreneurial purposes.
41
 Loans 
are given at market rates and lending risk is partially alleviated by issuing 
loans to groups of people.
42
 These loans are designed to provide capital to 
small-to-medium-sized enterprises. 
The most widely-praised model of microfinance is Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. Muhammad Yunus, an economics professor, founded 
Grameen Bank in 1976.
43
 Grameen Bank’s first loan was only twenty-
seven U.S. dollars,
44
 but by 1997 Grameen Bank had a portfolio of over 
$260 million U.S. dollars and 2.3 million borrowers.
45
 During that time, 
Grameen Bank’s repayment rate was 98%.
46
 Grameen Bank offered 
traditional banking services as well as some peripheral programs to benefit 
the Bangladesh community.
47
  
Grameen Bank significantly improved the lives of its borrowers. 
Income increased for 97.93% of borrowers.
48
 Grameen Bank’s efforts 
have been widely recognized by the international community. The 2006 
Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank 
 
 
 40. A collateral requirement for MFIs is impractical. Most people in poverty simply do not have 
any collateral to put up for a loan. Even if they do, it is very difficult to determine if they possess clear 
title to property. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD 
WORLD 162 (1989). 
 41. Micro-miracle: Grameen Bank’s Genius is the Principles it Puts into Action, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Micro-miracle-Grameen-
Bank-s-genius-is-the-1890919.php.  
 42. Most, but not all, MFIs require all group participants to be jointly liable for each other’s 
loans. Impact Evaluation for Microfinance: Review of Methodological Issues, WORLD BANK (2007), 
available at http://karlan.yale.edu/p/Doing_ie_series_07.pdf.  
 43. A Short History of Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=164 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 44. Muhammad Yunus: Helping the less privileged unleash their entrepreneurial skills, INSEAD 
KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 26, 2008), available at http://knowledge.insead.edu/csr/social-entrepreneurship 
/muhammad-yunus-helping-the-less-privileged-unleash-their-entrepreneurial-skills-1930. 
 45. This success is especially remarkable because it occurred during the course of several natural 
disasters which devastated many of the poor communities that Grameen Bank served. Mark Schreiner, 
A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, WASHINGTON UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS 
CTR. FOR SOC. DEV. (2003), available at http://www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Grameen_ 
CEA.pdf. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
Shahidur R. Khandker et al, Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability, WORLD BANK 
DISCUSSION PAPERS, at 83 (1995) available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/sites/default/files/ 
mfg-en-case-study-grameen-bank-performance-and-sustainability-oct-1995_0.pdf. These peripheral 
programs included social intermediation, where groups met and attended lectures on various moral 
issues. Grameen Bank typically used social intermediation to speak against child marriage, dowry, and 
to promote drinking clean water, self-education, and growing a garden. Id. at 133. 
 48. Impact of Microfinance in Bangladesh, GRAMEEN BANK http://www.grameen.com/ 
dialogue/dialogue46/specialfeature.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
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“for their efforts to create economic and social development from 
below.”
49
 The microfinance movement has continued to advance
50
 and 
capture attention from all over the world.
51
 
As microfinance has spread, there have been several instances where 
MFIs have been damaging to the communities they were designed to 
serve. India’s microfinance system is one such example.52 Unlike Grameen 
Bank, most Indian MFIs have regarded profit as their primary goal; they 
charge high interest rates, have dubious collection practices, and issue 
loans that are unreasonably large.
53
 India’s MFIs have a repayment rate of 
approximately 20%.
54
 It is safe to say that India’s microfinance sector has 
failed to match the success of Grameen Bank.  
Similarly to India, Nigeria also failed to adopt a microfinance model 
that would provide growth and alleviate poverty.
55
 Nigeria suffered a 
 
 
 49. The Nobel Peace Prize 2006, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013). Grameen Bank has also been recognized for helping empower women in 
developing countries. Elissa McCarter, Women and Microfinance: Why We Should Do More, 6 U. MD. 
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GEND. & CLASS 353 (2006) (stating the effectiveness of microfinance in helping 
advance women in developing societies as well as the benefits to MFIs that serve women). 
 50. International capital markets are starting to establish microfinance funds that have generated 
remarkable returns for their investors. See Rob Copeland, For Global Investors, ‘Microfinance’ Funds 
Pay Off, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125002519860023799. 
Access to these funds is not limited to institutional investors. Websites such as Kiva.com allow users 
to browse various microfinance projects from around the world and invest in them. See Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 
(2008) (detailing the success of Kiva.com, a social-networking site that allows users to make 
microloans to developing countries). 
 51. Following Grameen Bank and Yunus’ success, the United Nations deemed 2005 “The Year 
of Microfinance.” Citation. Since then, it has caught the attention of financiers such as George Soros 
and many global commercial banks (such as Citigroup and Deutsche Bank AG) are beginning to 
establish and invest in microfinance funds. Aneel Karnani, Microfinance Misses It’s Mark, STANFORD 
SOC. INNOVATION REV. (2007), available at http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/micro finance_ 
misses_its_mark Microfinance-works-even-without-a-Hollywood-ending. However, some firmly 
believe that microfinance has received too much attention and that microfinance is mistakenly 
considered to be a “silver bullet” for poverty. See Dean Karlan & Jacob Appel, Microfinance Works, 
Even Without a Hollywood Ending, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/new-economy/2011/0517/. 
 52. See generally David E. Solan, How Consumer Bankruptcy Reforms Can Help Save 
Microfinance in India, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 317 (2011).  
 53. David E. Solan, How Consumer Bankruptcy Reforms Can Help Save Microfinance in India, 
13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 317, at 320 (2011). Microfinance has become so unpopular in India that many 
politicians are running on anti-microfinance platforms. There are many proposals to dismantle 
microfinance institutions and these proposals have significant political support. These proposals seek 
to remove all MFIs from India, rather than provide meaningful reform and bring them more in line 
with the Grameen Bank model. Id. 
 54. David Roodman & Vijay Mahajan, India Rocked by Microfinance Crisis, NPR (Dec. 12 
2009), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131935206/India-Rocked-By-Microfinance-Crisis. 
 55. Florence Udoh, Why Microfinance Banks Failed in their Role as Grassroots Economics 
Developers, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 26, 2012), http://microfinanceafrica.net/news/nigeria-why-microfinance- 
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microfinance crisis similar to India throughout the early 2000s. Nigeria’s 
MFIs were poorly managed; managers typically paid themselves too 
much, and deposits were frequently embezzled.
56
 Additionally, Nigerian 
MFIs have charged interest rates on loans that range between 30 and 100 
percent.
57
 For these reasons, the people of Nigeria have little confidence in 
MFIs.
58
 Zimbabwe’s microfinance sector shares many of the 
characteristics of the failed microfinance sectors of Nigeria and India. 
IV. ZIMBABWE’S MICROFINANCE SECTOR 
Currently, Zimbabwe has a very small microfinance sector. Zimbabwe 
had over 1600 MFIs in 2003, but that number fell to less than 200 in 
2004
59
 and has remained at that level since.
60
 For a country with a 
population of over thirteen million
61
 and poverty rate of 72%,
62
 200 MFIs 
is insufficient. Additionally, 70% of working Zimbabweans are employed 
by small-to-medium-sized enterprises.
63
 These businesses stand to 
significantly benefit from microfinance.  
Zimbabwe’s existing MFIs seem to practice microfinance similarly to 
the Indian MFIs. For instance, the MFIs in Zimbabwe charge high interest 
 
 
banks-failed-in-their-role-as-economic-developers/. 
 56. Florence Udoh, Why Microfinance Banks Failed in their Role as Grassroots Economics 
Developers, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 26, 2012), http://microfinanceafrica.net/news/nigeria-why-microfinance-
banks-failed-in-their-role-as-economic-developers/. 
 57. Acha Ikechukwu, Microfinance Banking in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, INT’L J. OF 
FIN. & ACCOUNTING (2012), available at http://article.sapub.org/pdf/10.5923.j.ijfa.20120105.04.pdf. 
 58. See id. However, the Nigerian government strongly believes that a functioning microfinance 
sector is essential to economic growth. Despite the failure of over 200 MFIs, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria has continued to revise regulations for the Microfinance industry. Id at 108-09. See generally 
Revised Regulatory and Supervisory Guidelines for Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in Nigeria, CENTRAL 
BANK OF NIGERIA (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2013/CCD/Amended 
%20Regulatory%20and%20Supervisory%20Guidelines%20for%20MFB.pdf. 
 59. ZAMFI—MICROFINANCE IN ZIMBABWE, http://zamfi.org/mfizim.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2013). 
 60. This is largely because of the financial downturns outlined in Part I as well as the fact that 
most Zimbabweans (specifically those in rural areas) do not have access to formal banking. See Chris 
Muronzi, Zimbabwe not Overbanked, ZIM. INDEP. (Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://www.the 
independent.co.zw/2013/10/25/zimbabwe-overbanked/. 
 61. World Fact Book: Zimbabwe, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
 62. Zimbabwe Data, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/zimbabwe (last 
accessed on Oct. 27, 2013). 
 63. Kudzai Chimhangwa, Microfinance Act a Step Towards Easy Access to Loans for SMEs, THE 
STANDARD (Oct. 6, 2013), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201310060140.html. 
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rates.
64
 The Zimbabwe government has also received complaints regarding 
aggressive collection practices in the microfinance sector.
65
 Most 
Zimbabweans are easy targets for these predatory practices, because most 
Zimbabweans are not financially literate.
66
 The similarities between the 
Indian and Zimbabwean MFIs are troubling.  
Aside from the overall attitudes and goals of their proprietors, MFIs 
face several operational challenges. MFIs in Zimbabwe are 
undercapitalized and face difficulties in finding money to loan to potential 
borrowers.
67
 Additionally, few Zimbabweans have the experience 
necessary to properly manage an MFI.
68
 The lack of familiarity with 
management information systems has made it difficult for Zimbabwean 
MFIs to properly track loans and create financial reports.
69
 Fortunately, 
unlike the Indian government, Zimbabwe has demonstrated its 
commitment towards reforming the microfinance sector. 
V. THE MICROFINANCE ACT 
Zimbabwe’s new Microfinance Act (“the Act”)
70
 is a response to the 
aforementioned problems. If the Act is going to be successful in bringing 
the practices of Zimbabwe MFIs in line with the Grameen Bank model, it 
should (A) expand access to the microfinance sector, (B) stop unethical 
business practices, (C) promote financial literacy and provide social 
 
 
 64. Farai Mabeza, Microfinance Not Meeting Goals: Analysts, THE ZIMBABWEAN (July 24, 
2013), http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/67122/microfinance-not-meeting-goals-analysts. 
html. 
 65. Responsible Lending Critical in Microfinance Institutions, FIN. GAZETTE (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/responsible-lending-critical-in-microfinance-institutions/. 
 66. Kudzai Chimhangwa, Zimbabwe Govt. Regulates Microfinance Business, THE STANDARD 
(Sept. 8, 2013), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201309090398.html.  
 67. Lack of funding is believed to be “the major factor hindering the growth and development of 
MFIs in Zimbabwe.” Tendekayivanhu Mutambanadzo, Thomas Bhiri, & Smiller Makunike, An 
Analysis Challenges Faced by Zimbabwean Micro Finance Institutions in Providing Financial 
Services to the Poor and Informal Sector in the Dollarised Regime, GLOBAL J. OF COMMERCE & 
MGMT. PERSPECTIVE, at 154 (2013), available at http://ir.nust.ac.zw:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/ 
343/1/AN%20ANALYSIS%20CHALLENGES%20FACED%20BY%20ZIMBABWEAN%20MICRO
%20FINANCE.pdf [hereinafter Challenges Faced by Zimbabwean MFIs]. 
 68. See id. 
 69. A survey of Zimbabwean MFIS showed that approximately 56.2% use Excel spreadsheets to 
track loans, 18.2% use paper-based systems, and 25.6% use actual banking software. The survey 
pointed to the lack of available software that can properly manage MFIs as a principal cause for the 
use of such outdated information systems. Id. at 157. 
 70. The Act is currently before the Zimbabwe parliament. It was gazette on Aug, 30, 2013, and it 
is expected to pass in the near future. Bill Watch 43/2013, ZIM. SITUATION, http://www.zimbabwe 
situation.com/news/bill-watch-432013/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). 
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intermediation, and (D) help alleviate issues with funding and 
management which currently trouble MFIs. If the Act were able to achieve 
all of the above goals, it would put Zimbabwean MFIs closer to the 
Grameen Bank model. 
A. Expanding Access to the Microfinance Sector 
The Act aims to expand the microfinance sector in several ways. First, 
under the Act, MFIs will now be allowed to accept deposits.
71
 Currently, 
MFIs are not allowed to accept deposits; this makes it difficult for MFIs to 
lend money at a reasonable interest rate. Allowing MFIs to build up a 
portfolio of deposits will help provide them with a greater pool of money 
they can lend. 
Another possible benefit of allowing MFIs to accept deposits will be a 
reduction in the use of collateral. Currently, most MFIs in Zimbabwe 
require collateral because their small capital reserves cannot account for 
the risk that comes with providing collateral-free loans.
72
 These collateral 
requirements are highly impractical
73
 and do not work well with the ideal 
goal of an MFI, which is to provide banking services to the poor. 
The Act will also relax some licensing requirements for MFIs.
74
 Under 
the Act, MFIs can apply for perpetual licenses. This will alleviate MFIs 
from the burden of the license renewal process.
75
 This should ease the 
regulatory difficulties of starting an MFI in Zimbabwe and hopefully 
result in an increase in the number of MFIs in Zimbabwe.
76
 Overall, the 
Act seems to allow MFIs to act more like banks. This will not only benefit 
the poor by allowing them access to banking services, but will also benefit 
MFIs because they will have easier access to capital.  
 
 
 71. Kudzai Chimhangwa, Zimbabwe Regulates Microfinance Business, THE STANDARD (Sept. 8, 
2013), http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2013/09/08/zimbabwe-regulates-microfinance-business/. 
 72. ZAMFI—NATIONAL MICROFINANCE POLICY 5, http://zamfi.org/downloads/National%20 
Microfinance%20Policy.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
 73. Only about 18% of Zimbabwean small to medium enterprises possess enough collateral to be 
eligible for a typical microfinance loan. Blessing Bonga, Zimbabwe: Microfinance Bill to Benefit 
SMEs, THE HERALD (July 18, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201307180290.html. See also 
ZAMFI—MICROFINANCE IN ZIMBABWE, http://zamfi.org/mfizim.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 74. Clive Msipha, Microfinance Bill is Customer Friendly, ZIM. INDEP. (May 24, 2013), 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/05/24/microfinance-bill-is-customer-friendly/. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Additionally, the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank is hoping that the Microfinance Act is amended 
so that all regulations of the microfinance sector can be found under a single bill. This amendment 
would provide clarity and help make abiding by regulations less onerous. Taurai Mangudhla, RBZ 
Demands Microfinance Bill Be Amended, ZIM. INDEP. 13 (May 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/05/17/rbz-demands-microfinance-bill-should-be-amended/. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
350 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:337 
 
 
 
 
B. Curbing Unethical Business Practices 
The Act also contains reforms meant to address aggressive collections 
and other unethical business practices.
77
 Licensed MFIs will be required to 
adhere to rules regarding their collection practices and can now lose their 
licenses if they fail to adhere to these rules.
78
 The Act will also address 
disposition of collateral.
79
 Presently, MFIs are being accused of 
circumventing legal requirements related to disposition of collateral.
80
 The 
Act will require MFIs to obtain a court order before any part of a 
borrower’s collateral is repossessed or disposed.
81
  
C. Promoting Financial Literacy and Providing Social Intermediation 
Social intermediation was one of the most essential components of the 
Grameen Bank model.
82
 This concept is “defined as a process in which 
investments are made in the development of both human resources and 
institutional capital, with the aim of increasing the self-reliance of 
marginalized groups, preparing them to engage in formal financial 
intermediation.”
83
 Social intermediation is most effective when an MFI 
has strong relationships with its clients, a disciplined group formation 
process, and a savings program.
84
 Social intermediation may help 
 
 
 77. See Msipha, supra note 74. 
 78. See generally Victora Mtomba, Gono Tightens Screws on MFIs, NEWSDAY (May 15, 2013), 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/15/gono-tightens-screws-on-mfis/. 
79.Microfinance Institutions Warned, SUNDAY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26395. Gono Tightens Screws on MFIs, NEWSDAY 
(May 15, 2013). https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/05/15/gono-tightens-screws-on-mfis/. 
 80.  Gono Tightens Screws of MFIs, NEWSDAY (May 15, 2013), https://www.newsday.co.zw/ 
2013/05/15/gono-tightens-screws-on-mfis/. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Social intermediation for women has served to help remedy the education gap by providing 
them with guidance on how to run their businesses. P. Uday Shankar, Social Intermediation in 
Microfinance—Reminiscences of a Microfinance Practitioner, DEVELOPMENTCROSSING.COM (June 
19, 2009), http://www.developmentcrossing.com/profiles/blogs/social-intermediation-in (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2014). Social intermediation has also served to generate “social capital.” The goal of social 
intermediation is to promote cooperation among people and businesses so that a common goal can be 
achieved. S. Szabo, Social Intermediation Field Study Field Research Guide: Exploring the 
Relationship Between Social Capital and Microfinance, THE WORLD BANK (Sept. 9, 1999), available 
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/400219-1150464137254/field 
guide.pdf. 
 83. Elaine Edgecomb & Laura Barton, Social Intermediation and Microfinance Programs: A 
Literature Review, THE SEEP NETWORK, vii (1998), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ 
PNACD060.pdf. 
 84. Id. at 14–19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2015] REFORMING MICROFINANCE TO SUIT DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 351 
 
 
 
 
Zimbabwean MFIs fight both gender inequality and racial discrimination 
where it conflicts with sound business practices. 
Developing strong relationships with clients may be difficult for 
Zimbabwean MFIs. One reason for this is that the past behavior of MFIs 
has given them a poor reputation in Zimbabwe.
85
 It is possible that as 
MFIs expand the services they offer and discontinue charging egregious 
interest rates, borrowers are more likely to develop relationships with their 
lenders.  
Group lending is one the most innovative aspects of microfinance. 
When groups of borrowers are jointly liable for each other’s loans, the 
group tends to exclude risky borrowers.
86
 This helps MFIs lower risk and 
shifts part of the responsibility for loan underwriting on to the group of 
borrowers.
87
 It plays a vital role in social intermediation as well.
88
 Having 
group meetings allows fellow entrepreneurs to discuss best practices and 
allows the sharing of skills where some group members are uneducated or 
illiterate.
89
 Additionally, these meetings typically allow MFIs to promote 
social values.
90
 These group meetings are the chief means by which 
microfinance helps promote social progress. If MFIs take the position that 
gender and racial inequality are bad for business,
91
 promoting these ideals 
at group meetings will help encourage social progress and change attitudes 
regarding gender and race discrimination.
92
 
 
 
 85. See supra Part III; see also MFIs Behaving Like Goblins, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 2012, 
available at https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/12/12/mfis-behaving-like-goblins-2/. 
 86. Microfinance in Evolution: An Industry between Crisis and Advancement, DEUTSCHE BANK 
RESEARCH at 144 (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET 
_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000294314.pdf?kid=dbr.inter_ghpen.headline. See also Odongo Kodongo 
& Lilian G. Kendi, Individual Lending versus Group Lending: An Evaluation with Kenya’s 
Microfinance Data, REV. OF DEV’T FIN. at 99 (2013), available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/ 
S1879933713000158/1-s2.0-S1879933713000158-main.pdf?_tid=4b306be8-9808-11e3-b1a2-00000 
aacb360&acdnat=1392664894_5a91707b7b742bc0bea6389519eb5459. 
 87. Nuts and Bolts of Microfinance: Risk Management Examples and Tools, CMTY. DEV’T FIN. 
INST’S FUND, available at http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/resources/Nuts%20and%20 
Bolts%20of%20Microfinance%20Risk%20Mgt%20Examples%20and%20Tools.pdf (last accessed 
Feb. 17, 2014). 
 88. See Edgecomb & Barton, supra note 83, at 6–7. 
 89. Id. at 16. 
 90. Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Grameen-Style Microcredit Programs, 
http://grameenamerica.org/sites/default/files/Grameen%20Replication%20Guidelines.pdf, at 21–22. 
 91. See supra Part I. 
 92. Patrick Develtre & An Huybrechts, Evidence on the Social and Economic Impact of 
Grameen Bank and BRAC on the Poor in Bangladesh, BELG. HIGHER INST.OF LABOUR STUDIES 
(2002), available at https://hiva.kuleuven.be/resources/pdf/anderepublicaties/P2.pdf (describing the 
empowering effect Grameen Bank had on marginalized populations in Bangladesh). 
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Although the Act contains no provisions addressing group lending, it 
may be better if the regulatory bodies only encourage this practice 
informally. Reform legislation does not need to address this issue. Group 
lending does benefit MFIs by reducing the likelihood of default;
93
 
however, not all MFIs choose to employ this practice, and those who do 
not would be prejudiced if an absolute group-lending requirement was a 
part of microfinance reform.  
D. Address Management and Funding Issues 
Lack of funding, which is considered to be one of the greatest obstacles 
Zimbabwean MFIs face today,
94
 will likely be addressed by the Act. As 
mentioned, the new bill will allow MFIs to accept deposits.
95
  At this 
point, it is uncertain how much funding deposits will provide. Traditional 
sources of funding will still play a major role in supporting MFI lending 
activity.
96
 Traditional sources include donor funds, grants, personal funds, 
loans from commercial banks, and foreign financing.
97
 Currently, there is 
not a provision in the Act that would provide additional funding to MFIs 
from these sources. 
Although the Act does allow MFIs to accept deposits, establishing a 
strong savings program among MFIs will be very difficult given 
Zimbabwe’s past. During Zimbabwe’s hyperinflationary period, banks 
were unable to pay interest above the inflation rate and were unable to 
profitably loan money because of how quickly the Zimbabwean dollar was 
losing value.
98
 As a result, the banking system in Zimbabwe is 
underutilized.
99
 In fact, most Zimbabweans will only leave their money in 
 
 
 93. See Naveen Kumar, Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending: An Empirical 
Study of Progressive Lending Mechanism, NAT’L INST. FOR BANK MGMT IN INDIA, 
http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/2/2/2158244012444280.full (last accessed Oct. 28, 2013). 
 94. See Tendekayivanhu Mutambanadzo, Thomas Bhiri & Smiller Makunike, An Analysis 
Challenges Faces by Zimbabwean Micro Finance Institutions in Providing Financial Services to the 
Poor and Informal Sector in the Dollarised Regime, GLOBAL J. OF COMMERCE & MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE, 2013, available at http://ir.nust.ac.zw:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/343/1/AN%20 
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pdf. 
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2013), available at http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/balanced-microfinance-regulation-vital-for-
development/.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Supra note 95, at 156. See infra Part VII. 
 98. HARARE, In Dollars They Trust, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.economist. 
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a bank for a maximum of 90 days.
100
 It is not certain as to whether savings 
programs will be voluntarily utilized.  
The issues regarding MFI management may be difficult to solve 
through legislation. Considering the high rate of financial illiteracy in 
Zimbabwe, it is difficult to find suitable candidates to manage MFIs.
101
 
Additionally, the lack of adequate information systems has stifled 
effective management.
102
 The Act has no provisions that purport to 
remedy any of these management issues.  
VI. DEFICIENCIES OF THE MICROFINANCE ACT 
The main purpose of the Act seems to be to allow MFIs to operate 
more like banks. This purpose should allow MFIs to provide a broader 
range of services to Zimbabwe’s poor population; however, the Act is 
lacking in several crucial areas. The Act, as it is currently written, contains 
no provision for helping encourage social intermediation and no regulation 
on interest rates. Further, the Act will only indirectly affect the collateral 
requirement, which limits access to microfinance loans for Zimbabweans 
with limited financial resources. 
A. Failing to Encourage Social Intermediation 
The importance of a social intermediation component cannot be 
understated. It is a crucial element of microfinance; it helps enable a sector 
of the population previously thought to be helpless.
103
 Zimbabwean 
officials have publicly stated that MFIs should provide social 
intermediation,
104
 but there has been no movement to amend the 
Microfinance Act to include a provision calling for social intermediation. 
Social intermediation helps create social capital by educating borrowers.
105
 
Although it may be difficult to legislate and enforce social intermediation 
requirements, the Zimbabwean government could create companion 
programs, which would be offered to borrowers, to fill this void left by 
Zimbabwe’s MFIs. 
 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra Part III. 
 102. See Mutambanadzo, supra note 90. 
 103. See Edgecomb & Barton, supra note 83. 
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com/stories/201310030852.html. 
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B. Absence of Interest Rate Regulation 
One curious omission from the Act is any sort of regulation addressing 
the high interest rates MFIs have been charging. These interest rates have 
gone as high as 40% in a single month or 480% per annum.
106
 The 
Zimbabwe Association of Microfinance Institutions has resisted the 
implementation of interest rate caps, claiming they are “retrogressive to 
the development of a sustainable microfinance sector.”
107
 Reducing the 
MFI’s profits would do nothing to incentivize entry into the microfinance 
sector,
108
 but the current interest rates run counter to the goal of 
microfinance. These concerns could be addressed by allowing MFIs to 
better control risk rather than refusing to regulate interest rates. New 
interest rate regulations, which lay out viable enforcement mechanisms, 
should be part of the Act. 
C. Collateral Requirement 
Most MFIs in Zimbabwe use a collateral requirement, which severely 
limits access to microfinance loans.
109
 Although allowing MFIs to accept 
deposits may reduce their dependence on collateral,
110
 the strain that 
collateral requirements impose on potential borrowers is too great to 
depend on just a possibility that collateral requirements will be relaxed. 
Risk-reduction programs, such as an insurance fund, should be created for 
MFIs as part of the Act, and their use should be conditioned on either 
reducing or removing the collateral requirement. 
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D. Other Deficiencies 
Finally, the act needs to incorporate more innovative ways to create 
funding and facilitate effective MFI management. Grant programs have 
helped fund MFIs in the past and their expansion would tremendously 
benefit MFIs.
111
 One potential vehicle for facilitating effective MFI 
management would be to create a trade association for MFIs. A trade 
association would encourage the free flow of management ideas and best 
practices among MFIs. State-sponsored seminars and classes could also 
improve MFI management. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Overall, Zimbabwe stands to benefit tremendously from a well-run 
microfinance sector.
112
 A functioning microfinance sector can 
significantly expand the domestic market as well as help reduce poverty in 
Zimbabwe.
113
 However, there are many other economic hurdles that 
Zimbabwe must clear in order to recover from the economic crises that it 
faced in the early 2000s. 
Although the domestic market can be strengthened by a strong 
microfinance sector, its benefits are considerably limited when the flow of 
investment and capital into Zimbabwe is constrained.
114
 In order to 
maximize the benefits of the Microfinance Act and to assist Zimbabwe in 
its economic recovery, the Empowerment Act should be repealed and all 
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 112. Afrasia Kingdom, Microfinance Vital, THE FIN. GAZETTE (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www. 
financialgazette.co.zw/microfinance-vital/ (stating the importance of microfinance to the Zimbabwean 
economy as a mechanism for transferring capital from the formal to the informal sector). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See generally Eric Bloch, Unabated Sabatoge of Investor Confidence, ZIM. INDEP. (Apr. 12, 
2013), http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/04/12/unabated-sabotage-of-investor-confidence-2/ 
(stating that despite the very attractive investment opportunities in Zimbabwe, indigenization policies 
such as the Empowerment Act are undercutting investor confidence in Zimbabwe), contra Zimbabwe’s 
FDI Grows, http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/165-zimbabwe-s-fdi-grows (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) 
(stating that the FDI has increased to 400 million dollars, despite the indigenization policies). The 
Empowerment Act does not seem particularly popular, even amongst the native Zimbabweans, whom 
it is purported to assist. See Vince Musewe, Indigenisation Will Not Feed Us!, THE ZIMBABWEAN 
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/analysis/68561/indigenisation-will-not-feed-
us.html (arguing that Zimbabwean government needs to refocus on more pressing issues than 
indigenization, and that the Empowerment Act provides no immediate benefits to native 
Zimbabweans). Contra World’s Moved on Chinamasa, THE INDEP. (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/01/17/worlds-moved-chinamasa/ (stating that Zimbabwe’s 
government refuses to acknowledge the failure of indigenization, and that the growth of both the 
informal sector and the shrinking tax base are consequences of the Empowerment Act). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
356 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:337 
 
 
 
 
future indigenization efforts should be reviewed for potential economic 
consequences before they are enacted.
115
 In addition to avoiding a repeat 
of the economic crisis caused by land reform in the early 2000s, a repeal 
of indigenization policies may help persuade other nations (such as the 
United States) to discontinue sanctions against Zimbabwe.
116
 
Despite the recent crises, the Zimbabwe economy still shows incredible 
promise. Zimbabwe was once the fastest growing economy in Africa, and 
the damage done by the crises, which halted Zimbabwe’s growth can be 
undone. A strong microfinance sector will help Zimbabwe’s economic 
recovery and pull many Zimbabweans out of poverty; however, the 
Microfinance Act falls short of capturing the entirety of the Grameen Bank 
model. The success or failure of Zimbabwe will speak volumes about the 
value of microfinance as a tool for alleviating poverty in developing 
countries.  
Vincent D. Baumann
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